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INSURANCE-SOME SUGGESTED CHANGES
IN THE STANDARD POLICY PROVISIONS
PROMULGATED UNDER THE UNINSURED
MOTORIST LAW
With the enactment of the uninsured motorist law' in 1967,
the West Virginia Legislature sought to provide a minimum degree
of protection for the victim of the uninsured motorist.2 The
adopted plan requires that motor vehicle liability insurance poli-
cies issued in West Virginia contain a provision whereby the in-
surer is to compensate the insured for damages the insured is le-
gally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured
motor vehicle.'
Although the economic cost for the protection rests upon the
individual who purchases the policy, the benefits of the protection
are extended to include, generally, the members of the named
insured's family.4 To recover from the insurer, an insured need only
bring an action against the uninsured motorist to establish legal
liability and the extent of damages. No more is required of the
insured since the judgment that renders the uninsured motorist
liable also renders the insurer liable.'
The uninsured motorist law is implemented by requiring the
use of the Standard Policy Provisions which are promulgated by
the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner.6 Difficulties that have
so far arisen with the Standard Policy Provisions are, at least to
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume).
2 See, e.g., Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va.
1974).
No motor vehicle liability insurance policy may be issued "unless it shall
contain an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured all sums
which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator
of an uninsured motor vehicle .... W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Re-
placement Volume).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(c) (1975 Replacement Volume) provides:
As used in this section . . . the term 'insured' shall mean the named
insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any such
named insured, and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or other-
wise, and any person, except a bailee for hire, who uses, with the consent,
expressed or implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which
the policy applies ....
Snider v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 360 F. Supp. 929 (S.D.W. Va.
1973).
6 It is the duty of the West Virginia Commissioner of Insurance to promulgate
and require the use of Standard Policy Provisions for the uninsured motorist cover-
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some extent, a result of the indemnity principle of insurance.7
Violation of the indemnity principle can occur where one who
meets the statutory requirements of an insured under the provi-
sions of one insurance policy also meets those requirements under
the provisions of another policy. If the insured receives equal bene-
fits from each insurer, he has realized a net gain to the extent his
actual loss is less than the benefits he receives.' If the insured's
actual loss, as reflected in a judgment against the uninsured mo-
torist, is in excess of, or equal to, the combined limits of liability
of both policies, no net gain can be realized and no violation of the
principle can occur.
The protection required by the West Virginia uninsured mo-
torist law, considered in conjunction with the extensive use of the
automobile in this society, indicates that there are many instances
in which an injured party would have available more than one
uninsured motorist provision to cover a loss. Policy provisions such
as those once contained in the Standard Policy Provisions, and
generally referred to as "other insurance" clauses sought, in part,
to preclude any violation of the indemnity principle by the insured
receiving a net gain."° One of the subdivisions of the "other insur-
ance" clause is the "excess-escape" clause." Where loss occurs to
age. However, the use of the Standard Policy Provisions may be waived by the
Commissioner under certain circumstances. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(i) (1975
Replacement Volume). See also W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-10 (Replacement Vol-
ume).
I Insurance is designed for reimbursement of loss suffered. The indemnity
principle requires that the enforcement and interpretation of insurance contracts
be consistent with the objective of providing a benefit no greater than the loss
suffered. Where insurance benefits are greater than the loss suffered, there is a net
gain to the insured, and the principle is violated. R. KEETON, BASIC INSURANCE § 3.1
(1971) [hereinafter cited as KETON]. The vice of net gain is that it may encourage
gambling and the destruction of insured lives and property. Id. at §3.1(b).
For example, in West Virginia, the injured party is the named insured in
Policy A. He is in a collision with an uninsured motorist while he is operating, with
permission, a vehicle owned by another and insured under Policy B. Under Policy
A, the injured party is the named insured and will meet the statutory definition of
an "insured." He will also meet the statutory definition of an "insured" under
Policy B. If the injured party has secured a judgment from the uninsured motorist
equalling $8,000, then, arguably, he is entitled to benefits of $8,000 under Policy A
and $8,000 under Policy B. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(c) (1975 Replacement
Volume); KEETON, supra note 6, § 3.1(c).
Standard Policy Provisions-Uninsured Motorist Insurance, West Virginia
Insurance Department, Bulletin No. 2 (April, 1967).
"1 A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE, § 2.59 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as WIDISS].
[Vol. 79
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any insured in a vehicle other than a vehicle owned by the named
insured,' 2 the uninsured motorist coverage of the policy does not
apply unless: (1) there is no uninsured motorist coverage applica-
ble to such vehicle, or (2) the loss exhausts the limits of liability
of the uninsured motorist coverage that applies to such vehicle, but
then only to the extent the limits of liability of the coverage exceed
the limits of liability of the coverage that applies to the vehicle
involved in the loss.' 3 If the insured's judgment is less than the
limits of liability of the coverage applicable to the vehicle involved,
then the clause is salutary because it precludes net gain by the
insured.'"
The "other insurance" clause also includes what has been
termed the "pro-rata" clause.'" This provision" is applicable when
an individual owns more than one vehicle. If each of the vehicles
is separately insured with accompanying uninsured motorist cov-
erages, the effect of the clause is similar to the "excess-escape"
clause. The insured is unable to recover a net gain since the insurer
may limit his liability to that portion of the judgment which equals
the proportion that the limit of liability of his coverage bears to the
sum total limits of liability of all of the coverages available." How-
" To determine those who qualify as an "insured," see note 4 supra. The
"named insured" means "the person named as such in the declarations of the policy
or contract and shall also include such person's spouse if a resident of the same
household. . . " W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(c) (1975 Replacement Volume).
" See Standard Policy Provisions-Uninsured Motorist Insurance, West Vir-
ginia Insurance Department, Bulletin No. 2 (April, 1967), construed in Tulley v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
14 The "excess-escape" clause purports to provide coverage where the judg-
ment exceeds the limits of liability of the uninsured motorist coverage that is
applicable to the vehicle in which the loss occurred. As a practical matter, it
provides no coverage. Insurers uniformly market uninsured motorist coverage in the
minimum amount required by law. See note 71 infra. As a result, there is no
difference in the limits of liability of the uninsured motorist coverages. This is the
"escape" feature of the "excess-escape" clause. WIDiss, note 10 supra at §2.59.
, WmIss, note 10 supra at §2.61.
, A standard clause provides:
If the insured has other similar bodily injury insurance available to
the accident, the damages for bodily injury shall be deemed not to exceed
the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such
other insurance, and the company shall not be liable for a greater propor-
tion of any loss to which this coverage applies than the limit of liability
hereunder bears to the sum of the applicable limits of liability of this
insurance and such other insurance.
Tulley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp. 1123, 1126 (S.D.W. Va.
1972).
'1 If the judgment against the uninsured motorist is $10,000, and there are
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ever, where the insured's damages exceed the highest limit of lia-
bility of any of the provisions available, the clause deems the dam-
ages to be equal to the highest limit of liability of the available
provisions and each insurer is able to reduce its liability under the
coverage, since each will contribute on a pro-rata basis.' The net
effect is that the insured remains uncompensated while the insur-
ers, who uniformly market the coverage with maximum limits of
liability set at the statutory minimum amount required,'9 are able
to reduce their liability below the amount required by law."0
In Tulley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company,' the "excess-escape" clause was held to be invalid. The
plaintiff's judgment against the uninsured motorist equalled
$35,700. At the time the loss occurred, the plaintiff had in force,
as the named insured, an automobile liability insurance policy
with accompanying uninsured motorist coverage, and was operat-
ing a vehicle owned by his brother for which there was applicable
insurance that included uninsured motorist coverage. The limit of
liability for uninsured motorist coverage for each policy was
$10,000. However, if the "excess-escape" clause contained in the
policy issued to the plaintiff as the named insured were given
effect, the plaintiff's recovery would be limited to $10,000 or the
limit of liability of the uninsured motorist coverage contained in
the policy issued to the vehicle owner. The court found that since
available two uninsured motorist provisions, each with a limit of liability of $10,000,
the effect of the clause is to set each insurer's liability at $5,000, for a total recovery
of $10,000.
"1 If the judgment against the uninsured motorist is $20,000, and there are two
uninsured motorist provisions available to the insured with maximum limits of
liability of $10,000 each, $10,000 is the extent of damages. See note 16 supra. Each
insurer is liable for $5,000, which leaves the insured uncompensated for damages
for $10,000. This particular effect of the "pro-rata" clause has been upheld in some
jurisdictions. The rationale is that clear and unambiguous language in insurance
contracts cannot be disregarded because of the public policy favoring indemnifica-
tion. See, e.g., Otto v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2 Ill. App. 3d 58, 275 N.E.2d 766 (1972).
" See note 71 infra.
20 The limits of liability for the uninsured motorist coverage must be no less
than that required to prove financial responsibility under the Safety Responsibility
Law. W. VA. Con. ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume). Proof of financial
responsibility means the ability to respond in damages in an amount equal to
$10,000 for bodily injury to any one person in any one accident, $20,000 for bodily
injury to two or more persons in any one accident, subject to the limit for one
person, and $5,000 for property damage caused by injury to or destruction of prop-
erty of others in any one accident. W. VA. Cons ANN. § 17D-4-2 (1974 Replacement
Volume).
21 345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D. W. Va. 1972).
[Vol. 79
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the statute, as the controlling instrument, requires that each policy
contain a provision that undertakes "to pay the insured all sums
which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages,""2 a clause
in the insurance contract that attempts to limit the insurer's liabil-
ity to the amount by which its limits of liability exceed the limits
of liability of all other insurance is a qualification that conflicts
with the requirements of the statute and is, therefore, void and
unenforceable.? In addition, the court held that the clause could
not be validated by reason of its compliance with the Standard
Policy Provisions since the Standard Policy Provisions conflict
with the statute upon which they are based.24
The Tulley decision to hold the "excess-escape" clause void
received the approval of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals in Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,
There the court held that a clause in an insurance policy that, if
given effect, limits the recovery of benefits by an insured in a
manner that adds to or detracts from the requirements of the unin-
sured motorist law is void and ineffective. Therefore, an insured
may "collect upon as many policies as provide him coverage under
the statute up to the limits of both policies or the amount of the
judgment, whichever is less. '20
The same analysis in a slightly different framework was em-
ployed by the court in Bell to hold invalid a clause in the uninsured
motorist provision that purported to exclude coverage to an in-
sured while occupying a vehicle owned by the insured but to which
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume).
2 345 F. Supp. at 1128-29.-The trend among jurisdictions that have considered
the "excess-escape" clause is to refuse to construe the clause in a manner that
precludes indemnification up to the limits of liability of the provision. See, e.g.,
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 226 Ga. App. 710, 177 S.E.2d 257
(1970); Collins v. Motorist Mut. Ins. Co., 36 Mich. App. 424, 194 N.W.2d 148
(1971).
21 345 F. Supp. at 1129.
25 207 S.E.2d 147 (W. Va. 1974): The factual situation, as it applies to the
"excess-escape" clause, is similar to the factual situation in Tulley. The injured
party had available two separate uninsured motorist provisions. She was the named
insured in a policy the defendant had issued to her to insure a vehicle that she
owned; she also qualified as an insured under her father's policy since she was a
resident relative of the named insured. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(c) (1975
Replacement Volume). The issue was whether the "excess-escape" clause in her
father's policy precluded her from recovery under the policy in satisfaction of a
judgment totalling $20,000. See notes 10 and 11 supra.
28 207 S.E.2d at 151.
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the provision did not apply.Y Since the uninsured motorist law
does not make a distinction between vehicles the insured owns and
to which the policy provision applies and vehicles the insured owns
but to which the -policy provision is inapplicable,2 8 but, instead,
focuses upon the class to whom the insurer shall provide uninsured
motorist coverage,2" the clause is in conflict with the uninsured
motorist law and is void." Arguably, this represents a windfall to
the insured. If he owns three automobiles but purchases an insur-
ance policy for only one,3" then he is provided uninsured motorist
coverage for all of the automobiles.32 However, the windfall is illu-
sory since to take advantage of it necessarily requires foregoing all
other insurance on the additional automobiles.
As a result of the Bell decision, the Standard Policy Provisions
were revised33 and now reflect a removal of the "other insurance"
clauses. 4 However, it was a complete removal and represents, to
some degree, an overreaction, since not all of the clause was incon-
21 "This clause provides:
This uninsured motorist insurance does not apply:
(a) To bodily injury to an insured while occupying a motor vehi-
cle (other than an insured motor vehicle) owned by the named
insured or if a resident of the same household as the named in-
sured, his spouse or relatives of either, or through being struck by
such a motor vehicle."
Id. at 149.
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume). The distinction
is made, however, with respect to insurance policies issued to the insured providing
coverage for bodily injury liability and property damage liability. The coverage that
the law requires does not go beyond the motor vehicle for which the policy was
issued. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(a) (1975 Replacement Volume). See also W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-4-12 (1974 Replacement Volume).
" For purposes of the uninsured motorist law, the named insured and, if resi-
dents of the same household, his spouse and their relatives receive the benefits of
the coverage "while in a motor vehicle or otherwise." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(c)
(1975 Replacement Volume).
10 207 S.E.2d at 149-50; accord, Allstate Ins. Co. v. Meeks, 207 Va. 897, 153
S.E.2d 222 (1967) (similar statutory language).
1, Motor vehicle liability insurance is not mandatory in West Virginia. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 17D-3-4 (1974 Replacement Volume).
32 Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 S.E.2d 147, 151 (W. Va. 1974)
(Sprouse, J., dissenting).
u See Standard Policy Provisions-Uninsured Motorist Insurance, West Vir-
ginia Insurance Department, Bulletin No. 2 (Revised) (May, 1975).
1 The "pro-rata" clause has been held invalid by implication. See Moomaw
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 379 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.W. Va. 1974). The
passengers in a non-owned vehicle were allowed recovery up to the maximum limits
of liability on multiple policies issued to them as the named insureds. Id. at 701.
[Vol. 79
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sistent with the uninsured motorist law. The portion of the clause
that caused its invalidation in Bell was the language that pur-
ported to limit the application of the excess insurance to the
amount by which the limit of liability for the excess insurance
exceeded the limit of the primary insurance. 5 Short of this lan-
guage, the clause does not operate as a limitation on the uninsured
motorist law which would permit an insurer to escape all or a
portion of its liability and deny the insured coverage that he is
legally entitled to receive."
It is where the judment against the uninsured motorist ex-
ceeds the combined limits of liability of all the available uninsured
motorist provisions that the insured may recover the maximum
limit of liability of each provision as a result of the Bell decision.37
In many situations, however, the judgment will be less. In that
regard, the "other insurance" clause would provide an orderly pro-
cess for determining the priority of liability among the available
uninsured motorist provisions.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. United
States Fidelity and Guaranty Co.,31 the "other insurance" clauses
were invalidated because of their inconsistency with the uninsured
motorist law. Consequently, the court found no basis in the policy
provisions or the statute for determining which provision was pri-
mary and which was secondary.3' Since neither provision was pri-
mary, the court held that the liability of the insurers under the two
policy provisions should be evenly divided." However, equal con-
tribution by each of the available uninsured motorist provisions
may not always occur. 1 To the extent it does not, the liability
207 S.E.2d at 151.
1 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n., 211 Va. 133,
176 S.E.2d 327 (1970).
3 207 S.E.2d at 151.
' 358 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
=' Id. at 1146. But see Tulley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 345 F. Supp.
1123, 1125-26 (S.D.W. Va. 1972). The insurance for the vehicle involved in the
collision was designated as primary only for determining which policy, and its
exclusions applied to the issue to be decided in the case.
11 358 F. Supp. at 1147. The factors considered in arriving at this conclusion
are not articulated by the court.
" See generally Maryland Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas., 189 F. Supp. 764
(N.D.W. Va. 1960). The court was concerned with apportionment of liability among
three insurers for a claim against the bodily injury and property damage liability
coverages of their respective policies in a situation where there was no basis for
determining which was the primary insurer. Noting that the purpose of apportion-
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among the available uninsured motorist provisions is not predicta-
ble and is susceptible to becoming a litigous issue.
The insertion of an "other insurance" clause into the Standard
Policy Provisions would provide a predictable and orderly method
of distributing liability among the available uninsured motorist
provisions, assuming, of course, that the clause would be consis-
tent with the uninsured motorists law.2 If the application of the
clause is made contingent upon the loss occurring in a vehicle not
owned by the named insured, then, with regard to the vehicle in
which the loss occurs, the "other insurance" clause of that provi-
sion would not apply. Consequently, the insurer of the vehicle in
which the loss occurs would have the initial liability. This aspect
of the clause also precludes the possibility that the "other insur-
ance" clauses in the available policies will be mutually repugnant.
Other exclusionary clauses have been the subject of litigation
in West Virginia. In Tulley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.,43 the court also held void a clause in an uninsured
motorist provision that purported to reduce the limit of liability
under that provision by an amount equal to that part of the judg-
ment the insured was entitled to recover as expenses under the
medical payments coverage of the policy. The clause was held void
because such reduction of the limit of liability of the uninsured
motorist coverage was not authorized by the uninsured motorist
law. The purpose of the clause was to assure compliance with the
principle of indemnity." However, where the insured's damages
exceeded the limit of liability for the uninsured motorist coverage,
ment is to reach a just and equitable result, the court's opinion was that all the
circumstances should be considered. Those specifically considered by the court
included the limits of liability of the various coverages and the question as to the
degree of directness of each coverage to the risk that gave rise to the actual loss.
Id. at 775. See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
209 F. Supp. 83 (N.D.W. Va. 1962).
" An orderly method of distributing liability among the available uninsured
motorist insurers would undoubtedly increase the economic efficiency of claim
administration by reducing the duplicity of investigation and negotiation that
would occur where apportionment of liability was the rule. If the "other insurance"
clause designates the uninsured motorist provision applicable to the vehicle in-
volved in the collision as primary, then in the frequent case where the insured's
damages are less than the limits of liability of the primary provision, only the
primary insurer need be involved.
,3 345 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.W. Va. 1972).
" WInIss, note 10 supra at §2.63.
[Vol. 79
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the clause operated to reduce the liability of the insurer below that
which is required by the uninsured motorist law.45
An analogous situation exists within the present Standard
Policy Provisions.46 An insurer may reduce its liability to an in-
sured under the bodily injury liability coverage of the policy to the
extent the insured receives compensation under the uninsured
motorist coverage of the same policy." As with the other clauses
previously discussed, 8 questions as to the enforceability of this
clause would arise only where the insured's damages exceed the
limit of liability of the uninsured motorist coverage.
The factual situation that would give rise to the applicability
of the clause can briefly be set out. The named insured is operating
the insured vehicle and has one passenger, also an insured, accom-
panying him. There is a collision with an uninsured motorist, and
the passenger recovers a judgment against both the named insured
and the uninsured motorist as joint tortfeasors. The bodily injury
liability coverage protects the named insured and provides com-
pensation to the injured passenger. The uninsured motorist cover-
age provides compensation to the passenger since the passenger is
also an insured 9 and has established that he is legally entitled to
recover from the uninsured motorist. Assuming that the judgment
equals $20,000, and that the bodily injury liability coverage and
the uninsured motorist coverage are both at the statutory mini-
mum of $10,000 for any one person," then the clause operates to
11 Id. If the insured's damages total $11,000 and a payment of $1,000 is made
to the insured under the medical payments coverage of the policy, then the clause
allows the insurer to reduce its liability under the uninsured motorist coverage to
$9,000, which precludes full indemnification in this situation.
11 Standard Policy Provisions-Uninsured Motorist Insurance, West Virginia
Insurance Department, Bulletin No. 2 (Revised) (May, 1975).
" Id. at B-10. The clause provides:
5. Limits of Liability.
(c) If claim is made hereunder and claim is also made against any
person who is an insured under the Bodily Injury Liability or Property
Damage Liability coverages of the policy because of bodily injury or
property damage sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured
hereunder, any payment made hereunder to or for any such person shall
be applied in reduction of any amount which he may be entitled to
recover from any person who is an insured under the Bodily Injury Liabil-
ity or Property Damage Liability coverages.
' See text accompanying notes 9-27 supra.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(c) (1975 Replacement Volume).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-4-12(b)(2) (1974 Replacement Volume).
9
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limit the passenger's recovery under the policy to $10,000. This
occurs even though the passenger would have been fully compen-
sated had both of the joint tortfeasors been insured.
The clause does not on its face restrict the uninsured motorist
coverage since it is the bodily injury liability coverage that is re-
duced. Indirectly, however, the uninsured motorist coverage is re-
duced. To the extent it precludes indemnification to the insured
up to the maximum limits of liability of both coverages, the clause
conflicts with the statutory purpose of providing a minimum de-
gree of protection against loss caused by the uninsured motorist
since the insured will not be in the same position had the unin-
sured motorists had in effect a motor vehicle liability insurance
policy with the minimum limits required by law.'
Closely related is the question of whether it is appropriate
under the uninsured motorist law for an insurer to be able to re-
duce its liability to an insured to the extent the insured is compen-
sated by a separate insurer whose liability arose under a separate
policy issued to a joint tortfeasor.2 For example, the insured is a
pedestrian and receives injury as a result of the negligent operation
of two vehicles. A judgment against both follows. If one of the joint
tortfeasors is uninsured, then the pedestrian's uninsured motorist
coverage is applicable. However, if the other joint tortfeasor has
insurance coverage, then his insurer will compensate the pedes-
trian. At this point, the pedestrian's insurer may, under the Stan-
dard Policy Provisions,53 reduce the uninsured motorist coverage
51 Cf. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clem, 49 Ala. App. 459,
273 So. 2d 218 (1973); Harthcock v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d
456 (Miss. 1971).
52 The "excess-escape" clause and the "pro-rata" clause are applicable where
the injured party has more than one uninsured motorist provision available. See
notes 9 and 16 supra. In contrast, the clause under discussion is only relevant where
the injured party is compensated by the uninsured motorist or another who is
jointly liable to the injured party. See note 53 infra.
0 Standard Policy Provisions-Uninsured Motorist Insurance, West Virginia
Insuranc Department, Bulletin No. 2 (Revised) (May, 1975).
5. Limits of Liability
(d) Any amount payable hereunder because of bodily injury or
property damage sustained in an accident by a person who is an insured
under this coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid on account of such
injury or damage by or on behalf of
(i) the owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle and
(ii) any other person or persons jointly or severally liable together
[Vol. 79
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by an amount equal to the compensation received by the insured.
If the pedestrian is fully compensated on behalf of the insured joint
tortfeasor, the indemnity principle is satisfied since the pedestrian
is unable to recover under his uninsured motorist coverage." If,
however, the pedestrian's damages exceed the compensation re-
ceived, and the compensation equals or exceeds the limits of liabil-
ity of the pedestrian's uninsured motorist coverage, the uninsured
motorist carrier is allowed to reduce its liability to zero." To the
extent the pedestrian's uninsured motorist carrier reduces its lia-
bility with the pedestrian not being fully compensated, the pedes-
trian is not in the position he would have been had the uninsured
motorist been insured. 6
Although neither of the Standard Policy Provisions just dis-
cussed have been held invalid, the enforceability of either of these
clauses is open to question under the analysis employed to invali-
date the "excess-escape" clause," since both of these clauses limit
the liability of the insurer in a manner "more restrictive than the
uninsured motorist statute.""
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Bell v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,59 while referring to bodily
injury, held that "[w]ithin this required uninsured motorist cov-
erage there are no distinctions with regard to an owned but not
insured motor vehicle, as the coverage applies to use or occupancy
of 'a motor vehicle or otherwise.' ,o The Standard Policy Provi-
sions were revised to reflect this but retained the exclusion for
with such owner or operator for such injury or damage including
all sums paid under the Bodily Injury Liability or Property Dam-
age Liability coverages of the policy.
5, See notes 6-8 supra.
5 Assume the judgment against the joint tortfeasors is $20,000, the limit of
liability of the pedestrian's uninsured motorist coverage is $10,000 and the pedes-
trian has received $15,000 from the liability insurer of one of the joint tortfeasors.
Under the clause the uninsured motorist carrier may credit the $15,000 received to
its limit of liability, $10,000, and thereby reduce its liability to zero.
11 Invalidation of this clause has occurred in some jurisdictions in this situa-
tion. Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clem, 49 Ala. 457, 273 So. 2d
218 (1973); Michigan Mut. Liab. Co. v. Karsten, 13 Mich. App. 46, 163 N.W.2d 670
(1968). Contra, Sylvest v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 252 So. 2d 693 (La.
App. 1971).
11 See Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 207 S.E.2d 147, 151 (W. Va.
1974).
" Id. at 150.
5' Id. at 147.
'0 Id. at 149-50.
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property damage caused by an uninsured motorist to a motor vehi-
cle owned by the named insured or a resident of his household if
the liability coverages of the policy do not apply to such vehicle.'
The law requires that the insurer undertake "to pay the insured
all sums which he shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle .... ."I,
In addition, the uninsured motorist law, by reference, requires that
the coverage include a minimum of $5,000 to compensate the in-
sured for injury to or destruction of property caused by the unin-
sured motorist. 3 The statute, however, is silent as to the particular
property of the insured that must be included in the coverage.6
Bell provides little insight into the question since the court was
referring to the circumstances under which the members of the
family unit may receive uninsured motorist benefits." The deci-
sion that members of the family unit receive the coverage regard-
less of the fact that the loss might occur in a vehicle owned but
not insured is based on language in the uninsured motorist law
that requires the coverage "while in a motor vehicle or other-
wise."6 It is difficult to infer that by the use of the phrase "while
in a motor vehicle or otherwise" the legislative intent was in regard
to anything but bodily injury received by a member of the family
unit.
Since the question of the enforceability of this exclusionary
clause contained within the Standard Policy Provisions is not ex-
pressly answered by the uninsured motorist law nor by judicial
interpretation of the law, reference to the purpose for which the law
was enacted and the goal sought to be achieved becomes even more
important. The uninsured motorist law "seeks to assure at least
minimum relief from . . .a loss caused by an uninsured motor-
ist."" The coverage prescribed by the statute in providing this
11 Standard Policy Provisions-Uninsured Motorist Insurance, West Virginia
Insurance Department, Bulletin No. 2 (Revised) (May, 1975).
"2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume) (emphasis
added).
" Five thousand dollars is the amount required to prove financial responsibil-
ity for injury to or destruction of property of others. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-4-2
(1974 Replacement Volume). W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement
Volume) incorporates this amount as the minimum required.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 17D-4-2 (1974 Replacement Volume).
,S 207 S.E.2d at 149.
86 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(c) (1975 Replacement Volume).
67 Id. at 150.
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protection is to put the insured in the same position as if the
uninsured motorist had a motor vehicle liability policy with cover-
age limits at the statutory minimum."8 This being so, it should be
of no consequence that at the time of the collision with the unin-
sured motorist, the insured's property damage consisted of a vehi-
cle owned but not insured. If the property damage to the owned
but not insured vehicle was the result of the negligence of a motor-
ist who had in force a valid liability policy, the property damage
would clearly be recoverable. Consequently, the exclusionary
clause should be unenforceable because, in attempting to limit the
liability of the insurer, the clause operates to defeat the purpose
underlying the uninsured motorist law. 9
The insurance industry in the United States now markets
motor vehicle liability insurance with limits of liability of several
hundred thousand dollars. 0 It would seem that individuals who
purchase motor vehicle insurance in those amounts to protect
themselves against claims made as a result of their negligence
would also desire to purchase comparable coverage for their own
protection against loss inflicted by the uninsured motorist. Yet,
such coverage is unavailable in West Virginia, as insurers presently
offer the coverage only with limits of liability of $10,000 for bodily
injury per person, $20,000 for bodily injury for each accident, and
$5,000 for property damage for each accident," which is the mini-
mum limits of liability required by the uninsured motorist law.72
The uninsured motorist law does not, however, preclude higher
limits of liability; it speaks only of the minimum limits of liability
required. 3
61 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume) incorporates the
requirements of W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17D-4-2 (1974 Replacement Volume). See
Mullis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 So. 2d 229 (Fla. S. Ct. 1971);
Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clem, 49 Ala. 457, 273 So. 2d 218
(1973); WmIss, note 10 supra at §8.2.
11 There are no decisions interpreting the enforceability of this exclusionary
clause. One possible reason is that only six states require insurers to provide protec-
tion against property damage. WIDiss, note 10 supra at §2.57.
10 Id. at §8.2.
11 Interviews with L. Arnold Eddy, Authorized Agent, State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company, Morgantown, W. Va., October 27, 1976 and H. D.
White, Authorized Agent, Allstate Insurance Company, Morgantown, W. Va., Oc-
tober 27, 1976.
72 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume) provides that
the coverage must be "within limits which shall be no less than the requirements
of section two, article four, chapter seventeen-D [§ 17D-4-2] of the Code of West
Virginia, as amended from time to time . .. ."
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(b) (1975 Replacement Volume).
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The Standard Policy Provisions provide that the maximum
limits of liability for the uninsured motorist coverage shall be the
statutory minimum.74 To the extent compliance with the Standard
Policy Provisions is required,7" any initiative an insurer may have
to provide the coverage in greater amounts than the statutory min-
imum is foreclosed. Since the minimum coverage required by law
may be inadequate," such foreclosure is undesirable and, also,
unnecessary under the uninsured motorist law.
Recent litigation has invalidated some of the exclusionary
clauses contained in the Standard Policy Provisions promulgated
by the Insurance Commissioner of West Virginia. In response,
these clauses have been removed. Whether total removal was re-
quired or whether enough has been done is questionable. A further
modification of the Standard Policy Provisions is recommended to
include a modified "other insurance" clause, to remove certain
limiting clauses, and to remove any requirement that the maxi-
mum limit of liability for the coverage be at the minimum level
required by the law. If for no other reason than to provide certainty
of coverage to insurers and insureds, the Standard Policy Provi-
sions should comply with requirements of the statute.
Thomas Evans
, Standard Policy Provisions-Uninsured Motorist Insurance, West Virginia
Insurance Department, Bulletin No. 2, B-4 (Revised) (May, 1975).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-31(i) (1975 Replacement Volume) requires the use
of the Standard Policy Provisions, but this requirement can be waived by the
Commissioner. Grounds for waiver exist where the use of the standard provision is
unnecessary for the insured's protection and inconsistent with the purpose of the
policy. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-6-10(a) (1975 Replacement Volume).
"' W. PROSSER, LAW OF ToRTS § 84, at 557 (4th ed. 1971).
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